


























THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRI-
TORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1 
signed by 44 of the 86 participating states attending the United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, fro1n 
February 24 to April 28, 1958, represents little more than a half-loaf 
of accomplishment. A full loaf would have included agreement on 
the most important aspect of the territorial sea, its breadth; a more 
realistic concept of contiguous zones; and a solution of the coastal 
fisheries problem, or at least a separation of that problem from the 
question of the territorial sea. 
In 23 substantive articles the Convention summarizes the law of 
the territorial sea without ever specifying its exact breadth. Although 
Section II of the Convention is entitled "Limits of the Territorial 
Sea," those limits are expressed in terms so vague and indecisive as 
to be almost meaningless : 
"The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every 
point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the 
baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea." 2 
The Geneva Conference of 1958 actually lost some ground on this 
Inatter as compared 'vith the agreement reached by the International 
Lavv Commission in its final articles (1956) .3 The Commission 
1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 52 (1958). 
2 Ibid., Art. 6. Jessup calls this language an "impeccable conclusion" of the 
Conference. Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," 
59 Oolu1nbia Law Review 234, 243 (1959). A "meaningless conclusion" would 
seem to be somewhat more accurate than Jessup's description. "Impeccable" 
means free from fault or error; irreproachably correct. Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary 1247 (2d Ed. Unabridged 1944). A statement is hardly free 
from fault or error and irreproachably correct which is meaningless. 
3 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 4 (1956). Article 3 of the I.L.C. final draft provided in 
part, (1) "The Commission recognizes that international practice is not uniform 
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea. (2) The C01nmission considers 
that international law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond 
twelve miles. (3) The Commission, without taking any decision as to the 
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had concluded that "international law does not permit an extension 
of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles," and by implication at 
least had recognized the minimum breadth of three miles. But the 
Convention as adopted in 1958 contains no reference either to a sug-
gested maximum or minimum, although the record of the Conference 
leaves little doubt that the claims of a few states to a territorial sea 
beyond 12 miles find no support by the vast majority of states. 
Committee I of the Geneva Conference became hopelessly dead-
locked in trying to delimit the territorial sea, even on some com-
promise proposals by the United Kingdom,4 Canada,5 the United 
States,6 and other states 7 which would have increased the breadth 
breadth of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes on the one hand, that many 
States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, 
that many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their own ter-
ritorial sea is less .... " 
4 Despite her long adherence to the three-mile limit, the United Kingdom intro-
duced a proposal to extend the territorial sea to six miles. However, it was 
a tempered proposal which would not have recognized sovereignty of the coastal 
state over the outer three miles since it preserved "existing rights of passage for 
aircraft and vessels, including warships, outside three miles." U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 134 (1 April1958). 
5 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 77/Rev. 3 (1958). This third revision of the 
Canadian proposal gave the coastal state a six mile territorial sea and exclusive 
fishing rights in an outer six miles as well. Also see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, 
(Annexes) 209-254 for this and other proposals by various states. 
6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 159/Rev. 2 (1958 and U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/39, (Annexes) 253 (1958). The essence of the revised U.S. proposal which 
came closer than any other to being adopted provided for a territorial sea of six 
miles plus a conditional exclusive right to fish in the outer six miles of a twelve 
mile zone. The condition gave other nations who had fished in the outer six 
miles for a period of five years immediately preceding the signature of this con-
vention (the first proposal of the United States specified a ten-year period) the 
rigl:it to continue fishing in said area. 
7 Canada, India and Mexico entered a joint proposal which provided for a 
1naximum breadth of territorial sea up to six nautical miles, except that if prior 
to 24 February 1958 (i.e. the start of the Conference) a state had declared its 
territorial sea to be in excess of six miles the breadth was to be so fixed but not 
exceeding twelve miles. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/77/Rev. 2 (1958) and U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 13/39/SR. 232 (1958). Previously India and Mexico had joined 
in proposing a 12 mile territorial sea (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 79). Colombia also 
proposed 12 miles (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 82 & Corr. 1), as did Yugoslavia with 
the additional provision that the minimum <;ould not be less than three miles 
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 135). In addition to Canada, the United States, and the 
joint proposal of Canada India and Mexico, the following also proposed six miles 
for the territorial sea: United Kingdom (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 134), Italy 
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 137), Ceylon (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 118) and Sweden 
(A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 4). Peru proposed that no limit be specified other than 
"reasonable limits" and that the breadth be fixed "preferably by regional agree-
ments" (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 133/ Add. 1 & 2). 
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from three miles, universally recognized as the m1n1mum and 
presently supported by the greatest number of large maritime states 
in the world, to six miles. 
Although the United States proposal of a six-mile territorial sea 
failed by a mere seven votes to get the necessary two-thirds majority 
in the plenary session,8 which was the closest that any proposal on 
the breadth of the territorial sea came to passing, it became apparent 
at the end of the Conference that further discussions on this crucial 
matter 'vould achieve nothing and that the most j-udicious procedure 
would be to adopt the half-loaf as provided in the Convention. On 
the final day the Conference passed a resolution requesting the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations to consider the advisablity of 
convening another conference at a later date for the purpose of at-
tempting to reach agreement on a specific breadth for the territorial 
sea. 9 This second conference on the law of the sea has been called 
for March, 1960. (See addendum to this chapter regarding the 1960 
Conference which failed to reach agreement on a delimitation of the 
territorial sea.) Actually it is the third world-wide conference re-
lating to the territorial sea if one counts the ill-fated Hague Con-
ference of 1930 10 at which the 47 states participating were in such 
heated disagreement that the conference ended without adopting any 
articles on the territorial sea and without a single proposal as to a 
specified breadth even being put to a vote.11 
It is unfortunate, and some,vhat ironical, that although the 1958 
Conference did not specify a breadth for the territorial sea, which 
it should have done, it did specify a breadth (12 miles) for the con-
tiguous zone, which it should not have done. It would have been 
wiser to have concluded that a coastal state has the right to exercise 
the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary regulations, within reasonable distances from 
the coast in contiguous zones beyond the territorial sea.12 
8 Dean, "U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," 38 State Dept. Bull. 1110 
(1958); Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: "\Vhat Was 
Accomplished," 52 A.J.I.L. 607, 614 (1958). 
9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 56 (1958). 
10 24 A.J.I.L. 52 (1930) and Supp.1-79, 169-258 (1930). 
11 Reeves, "The Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters," 24 A.J.I.L. 
486, 492 ( 1930) . 
12 Jessup supports this view; Jessup, op. cit., footnote 2 (at 234, 244). The 
I.L.C., however, seems to have felt bound (without giving reasons) to the figure 
of 12 miles for the contiguous zone as adopted by the Preparatory Committee 
of The Hague Codification Conference of 1930. U.N. Doc. A/3159, 40 (1956). 
Poland introduced a desirable proposal which eliminated reference to a precise 
width of the contiguous zone and also included reference to security, but it 
failed. "In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal 
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When considering the limited rights of control which a coastal 
state may exercise in the high seas beyond a territorial sea in order 
to prevent violations of certain of its regulations, the test of reason-
ableness as to area of control is more appropriate than a fixed limit.13 
On the other hand, when a coastal state is exercising sovereignty, as 
in the case of its territorial sea, under which it has exclusive and un-
limited rights over the waters and airspace above, except for the right 
of an overseas state to "innocent passage" on the sea, but not in the 
airspace, then the limit of that sovereignty should be both fixed and 
narrow. It should be fixed so that all states may know the exact 
border separating the sovereign area of the territorial sea from the 
free area of the high seas to inclusive use by all states. It should be 
narrow in order that the coastal state will encroach as little as pos-
sible on the free and unfettered use by all states of the world's greatest 
common resource-the high seas. 
It would have been more in conformity 'vith state practice and far 
more realistic to have framed the article in terms of contiguous zones 
because a state's area of control over adjacent high seas may need to 
vary depending upon the purpose of the control and upon local and 
world conditions at any given time. States do in fact claim the right 
to exercise limited control over contiguous zones of high seas of vary-
ing widths adjacent to their coasts. 14 
A more basic fault of the Conference was the inclusion of the article 
on the contiguous zone in the Convention on the Territorial Sea.15 
Since the waters of the contiguous zone are high seas it would have 
been more appropriate to have put the contents of this article in the 
Convention on the High Seas rather than tacking it on to the 23 sub-
stantive articles on the territorial sea. Its inclusion in the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea creates the danger that the rights of coastal 
states in the contiguous zone will be considered more nearly related 
to the sovereignty which the state has over its territorial sea than to 
the minimum, lin1ited rights of control which actually exist.16 More-
State may take the measures necessary to prevent and punish infringements 
of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations, and violations of its security." 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 78 (1958). 
13 For Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's oft-cited test of reasonableness in this con-
nection see Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Oranch) 187,234-35 (1804). 
14 United Nations Synoptical Table, "T,he Law of the Sea," pamphlet by Society 
of Comparative Legal and International Law. 36 (1958). 
15 The I.L.C. in its final draft articles ( 1956) had the article on the con-
tiguous zones (No. 66) clearly separated from the articles on the territorial sea 
(Nos. 1-25). This separation is preferable to the results achieved by the Geneva 
Conference of 1958. U.N. Doc. A/3159, 39 (1956). 
16 The United Kingdom and Greece made a similar argument in the plenary 
meetings of the Conference but were opposed by Canada and Ukrainian S. S.R. 
(U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/38, 69 (1958).) 
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over, for the states now claiming a territorial sea of 12 miles, the 
limits of said sea and the contiguous zone of 12 miles as provided 
in the convention are coextensive, making the contiguous zone mean-
ingless and unnecessary. 
An analysis of the Conference record suggests that if the concept 
of contiguous zones had not only been separated from the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea, but also had been enlarged to include 
preferential (or in special cases, exclusive) fishing rights in said 
zones, quite apart from the proposals to extend the territorial sea 
primarily for the purpose of achieving exclusive fishing rights, it 
might have been possible to have retained the three-mile limit for 
the territorial sea, or at least to have secured agreement on a six-mile 
limit as proposed by the United States, Canada and other participants. 
In view of the failure of the Conference to agree upon a fixed 
breadth of the territorial sea, what is the present law? The si1nplest 
answer, although not an entirely satisfactory one, is that the law 
is what it was before .the Geneva Conference: uncertain. 
On the one hand, a greater number of states, including most of the 
major maritime powers, adhere to the three-mile limit than to any 
other single lirnit.17 The three-mile limit is recognized by nations 
responsible for about two-thirds of the world's maritime traffic.18 On 
the other hand, if the customary internationalla'v on this matter is to 
be determined by mere numbers of states which claim more than a 
three-mile territorial sea (i.e., 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, and even 200 miles) then 
it may be argued that the three-mile limit is not the law and one is 
left with the not-too-helpful conclusion of the International Law Corn-
mission that 
"The Commission, without taking any decision as to the 
breadth o£ the territorial sea up to that limit, (i.e., twelve 
miles) notes, on the one hand, that many States have fixed a 
breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that 
many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of 
their own territorial sea is less." 19 
17 Sorensen, "The Law of the Sea," International Conciliation, No. 520, at 
244 (1958). 
18 In the meetings of the First Committee the Canadian delegate said that 
the three-mile limit had been recognized by nations responsible for some 80% 
of the world's maritime traffic. 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 90 (1958)). 
This same percentage was used by the British delegate to the Hague Conference 
in 1930 when he said that the limit of three miles was recognized "and adopted 
by maritime nations which possess nearly 80% of the effective tonnage of the 
world." Reeves, "The Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters," 24 
A.J.I.L. 494 ( 1930). As of December 31, 1958, sixty-five per cent is a more ac-
curate figure. "Merchant Fleets of the World," 2-3, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Maritime Administration ( 1958). 
19 U.N. Doc. A/3159 Art. 3 (3), 4 (1956). 
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After the United States compromise proposal to extend the terri-
torial sea to six miles failed in plenary session to get the necessary 
two-thirds vote, Arthur Dean, Chairman of the Delegation, empha-
sized that the three-mile rule vvas still the established law which could 
only be changed by agreement.20 Similarly, the United l(ingdom dele-
gate made a statement confirming the continued existence of the three-
mile limit as the only breadth recognized under international la vv. 21 
By contrast, Professor Tunkin, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, 
vvas equally convinced that "the three-mile limit is not and never has 
been a generally recognized rule in the law of the sea." 22 
While it is true that in recent years the world has vvitnessed an 
increasing ntunber of claims by coastal states to a wider territorial 
sea,Z3 the long history of state practice by the principal maritime 
states supports the conclusion that the three-n1ile limit still more 
nearly represents customary internationa.lla w than any other figure. 24 
Certainly this minimlun breadth of territorial sea represents the most 
rational preference viewed from the perspective of the world com-
Inunity for achieving the maximum utilization of the high seas.25 
What are the prospects for reaching agreement on a specific 
breadth of territorial sea at a future United Nations Conference? 
The ans·wer to this important question depende upon a number of 
factors, some of vvhich are unrelated to the basic question of the 
20 Dean "U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," op cit., footnote 8 (at 574). 
Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished," 
op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607, 616). Said Mr. Dean, "The fact that a two-thirds 
vote could not be obtained in favor of the three-mile limit shows merely a de-
sire on the part of many nations to extend their territorial sea, not that such 
an extension in international law has been accomplished." (Ibid., at 616.) 
21 Report, First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Misc. No. 
15, 6 ~London, 1959). Also see U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/SR. 584 (1958). 
22 Tunkin, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea," International 
Affairs 47, 48 (Moscow, 1958) ; 2 Official Records (A/OONF. 13/38, 37 (1958)). 
23 MacChesney, U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation and 
DocumentB-1956 401-501 (1957) ; Oda, "New Trends in the Regime of the 
Seas," 18 Zeitschrift Filr Auslandisches ofjentlisches Recht und Vollcerrecht 
61-87 (1957). 
24 See generally, Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jttris-
diction 76 (1927). The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911) ; Crocker, Extent of the 
Marginal Sea (1919) ; Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under In-
ternational Law (1942) ; Higgins and Colombos; International Law of the Sea 
(2d Ed. 1951). For a recent statement which confirms the validity of the 
three-mile rule until the present century, but suggests that state claims to a 
wider territorial sea have caused the rule to "melt away," see Garcia-Ainador, 
'l'he Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea 26-28 (1959). 
25 McDougal & Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives 
Versus National E,goism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539, 584 fn 154 (1958) (at 539). 
607631--~61--7 
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values at stake in reconciling the competing clai1ns to inclusive and 
exclusive uses 26 of the total resources of the sea. 
One of the most striking illustrations o:f the burdens 'vhich an exten-
sion o:f the territorial sea :from three to six miles (or to twelve miles) 
"\vould place upon the :freedom o:f the seas is the :fact that of more than 
100 important international straits 'vhich are now high seas, more than 
fifty would be reduced to territorial seas if the six-mile rule replaced 
the three-mile rule, and all would become territorial 'vaters under a 
twelve-mile rule. For example, it has been pointed out in the case of 
26 The tern1s "inclusive and exclusive uses" are used here in the san1e sense as 
used by McDougal & Burke to whom an indebtedness is acknowledged. They 
have written : 
"By an exclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over 
specified activities which other states cannot share with the claimant state (the 
category of authority state A gets, state B cannot get). By such a claim, the 
claimant state commonly. asserts a cOinpetence to apply its authority to all 
persons in an area or engaged in certain specified activities, irrespective of the 
nationality of the person. Examples n1ay be noted in the claims coastal states 
make for control over 'internal waters' and 'territorial sea'. 
"By an inclusive claim is meant a claim to authority over an area or over 
specified activitites which the claimant state can, by some accommodation to 
avoid physical interference in use, share with another (the category of authority 
state A gets, state B can also get). By such a claim, the claimant state com-
monly asserts a cOinpetence to apply its authority only to its own nationals. 
concedes a comparable authority with respect to the area or activities to other 
states with respect to their nationals and demands that other states reciprocally 
refrain from the exercise of authority over its nationals and their activities in 
the area. Examples may be noted in the claims states Inake to navigation and 
fishing on the high seas." 
lVIcDougal and Burke, Ibid. It should be emphasized, of course, that even 
so-called exclusive uses are subject to accommodation with other uses. For 
example, a coastal state's sovereignty (i.e., the right of exclusive use) over its 
territorial sea is subject to the right of innocent passage (i.e., overseas states 
must be accomrrwdated by permitting them to navigate through the territorial 
sea under certain conditions such as innocent passage). But the duty of ac-
commodation in the case of the exclusive use is different from the less than 
in the case of inclusive uses. For example, the right of innocent passage may 
be limited by reasonable rules, and in some cases suspended if the coastal 
state, in a ·sense the domJinant user, feels its security is jeopardized. By 
contrast, in the case of inclusive uses, the duty of accommodation is equally 
strong among all parties since no one user is dominant per se. Hence, an in-
clusive user must accommodate all other users on the high seas. Each has · 
equal access to the high seas for navigation, fishing, scientific investigation, 
cable laying, etc. Despite these refinements, and others which con1e into play 
in connection with safety zones around continental shelf installations, fisheries 
conservation zones, and "limited-exclusive-use" areas of the high seas for spe-
cial purposes such as weapons testing in restricted zones nor1nally open for 
inclusive use by all states, the simple formulation of exclusive use and inclusive 
use by McDougal and Burke is adequate to describe the two major types of 
competing claimants to the resources of the seas. 
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the Straits of Gibraltar that if the territor ial sea is extended to s1x 
1niles, the ent ire strait \viii become a territorial sea \vith no area of high 
seas remaining. 27 
\Vhile it can be argued that all states will st ill have the right of 
innocent passage through such international straits fron1 one part of 
the high seas to another under the Oorfu Channel Oase,28 and under 
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone, 29 the fact ren1ains that the right of innocent passage is often 
viewed as a limited right subject to the "laws and regulations enacted 
by the coastal state" 30 and subject in special circumstances to tempo-
rary suspension. 31 Moreover, one of the greatest burdens which the 
transformation of high seas into territorial seas in 1nore than 100 inter-
national straits would impose upon all states of the \Vorld, coastal and 
non-coastal, is to preclude the right to fly over the areas. Airspace 
over the territorial sea does not afford the right of "innocent passage," 
1neaning that states which now fly over the high seas of these interna-
tional straits would be burdened by having to request permission of the 
coastal states to do so, or fly more circuitous, and therefore more costly, 
routes. 32 
B. COASTAL FISHERIES AND T'HE TERRITORIAL SEA 
Basically the coastal fisheries proble1n is an economic struggle be-
tween two sets of competing claimant states: those w·hich may be 
described generally as "coastal fishing states" such as Canada, Ice-
land, and a number of Latin American states, and the "overseas fish-
ing states" such as the United States, the United l{ingdom, Japan, 
and the Nether lands. 
The coastal fishing states \vant exclusive fishing off their coasts 
for a distance of 12 miles or more. By contrast, the overseas fishing 
states want a narro\v exclusive fishing belt of only three miles, or at 
most six miles, in order that their fishing fleets may fish near the 
coasts of other states. Of course, some states such as the U nited 
States, the United l{ingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands are both 
ooastal fishing and overseas fishing states. Yet, despite this dual 
27 Dean, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, op. cit., footnote 8 (at 574, 579) . 
28 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4. 
29 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, Art. 16(4) (1958). It should be noted that 
the Convention goes beyond the decision in the Corfu Channel Case in that the 
Convention provides for passage fron1 one part of the high seas to another 
part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State. (Emphasis added.) 
The decision was limited to passage between two parts of the high seas. 
30 Ibid., Art. 17. 
31 Ibid., Art. 18. 
32 See the cogent arguments of the United Kingdom delegate in the First 
Committee. 3 Official Record.'S ( A/CONF.13/39, 104 ( 1958) ) . 
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fishing interest, these states are primarily overseas fishing states. 
They are also important maritime powers and therefore have long 
championed a narrow territorial sea of three n1iles in the over-all 
interest o£ the maxlin urn freedom of the high seas. 
It should be emphasized that not all coastal fishing states neces-
sarily want a twelve-mile (or wider) territorial sea; indeed some 
would prefer not to have it if there were another way to achieve an 
extended area of exclusive coastal fisheries. For example, Canada has 
:favored a three-mile territorial sea for a number of years even though 
she is a coastal fishing state. In one of her early proposals in the First 
Committee of the 1958 Conference, Canada advocated a three-mile 
territorial sea, accompanied by a provision for exclusive fishing rights 
in the outer nine miles of a twelve-mile contiguous zone.33 In a sub-
sequent revision Canada proposed a six-mile territorial sea plus ex-
clusive fishing rights in the outer six miles of the contiguous zone. 
The Canadian proposals, as well as those of the United States and 
other countries, indicate· rather clearly the extent to which the coastal 
fisheries problem dominated the discussions on the territorial sea. In 
a report on the Geneva Conference to the Canadian House of Com-
mons, Hamilton indicated the ambivalent attitude of the Canadian 
delegation, 
". . . our dilemma was, how could we reconcile the defense 
interests, freedom of the seas and the freedom of the air, 
which really requires a very narrow territorial sea, and the 
needs of our people on our coasts for some priority in 
harvesting fish off their shores ~" 34 
The willingness of some states at the Conference to sacrifice the 
larger, more important values of security, freedom of the seas and 
:freedom of the air, in order to gain exclusive fishing rights in an 
expanded territorial sea, was not only highly questionable but 
unnecessary. 
It was questionable in terms of values: from the perspective of 
the world community of states the value of exclusive rights to a few 
million tons of fish are not worth the burdens to security and maxi-
mum freedom of the seas and the air which would result from an 
extension of the territorial sea. 
It was unnecessary because the -~quintessence of the solution, which 
seems to have been buried at the Conference under a multitude of 
irrelevant arguments, is that it is npt essential to extend the territorial 
~.• -5\4,1!' 
83 U .. N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L. 77/Rev.1 (1958). 
34 8 External Affairs (Aug. 1958). 
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sea beyond the present three-mile limit in order to grant the coastal 
state preferential, or, in exceptional cases, exclusive fishing rights with-
inlimited areas beyond the territorial sea, vvhenever it is decided that 
this is desirable. 
The coastal fisheries problem could have been solved quite apart fro1n 
a blanket extension of the costal state's sovereignty over the territorial 
sea by expanding the concept of the contiguous zones to include not 
only the limited rights of protection of a coastal state against viola-
tions of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations, and 
security, but also to provide varying degrees of preferential fishing 
rights, and, in a few cases exclusive fishing rights where the special 
circumstances seem to justify them. 
It is true, of course, that the First Committee of the Conference did 
attempt to solve the coastal fisheries problem, but it did so in a 1nanner 
which kept fisheries tied to the breadth of the territorial sea with the 
result that the proposal was defeated in plenary session. 
The First Committee adopted a special article (Art. 3) as part of 
the articles on the Territorial Sea which provided exclusive fishing 
rights to the coastal state in a 12-mile zone. The proposed article read, 
"A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea 
extending to a limit twelve nautical miles from the baseline 
from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured in 
which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the ex-
ploitation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its 
territorial sea." 35 
Ostensibly this proposal has no bearing upon the breadth of the 
territorial sea which, presumably, could have been kept at the present 
three miles or could have been increased to six miles or to some other 
figure. However, the discussions leading up to the adoption of the 
proposal in the First Committee, and to its defeat in the plenary meet-
ings, make it clear that it was bound inextricably with the question of 
the breadth of the territorial sea. In fact, it was voted upon in the 
fourteenth plenary meeting just prior to the vote on the United States 
compromise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea with exclusive fish-
ing rights in the outer six miles except for historic rights, and similar 
proposals relating to the breadth of the territorial sea.36 
The 12-mile exclusive fishing zone article failed to get the necessary 
two-thirds vote in plenary meetings, with 35 votes in favor, 30 against, 
35 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 168/Add. 1, Annex (1958). 
86 3 O,f/icial Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 
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aud 20 abstentions. 37 From an analysis of the vote one may conclude 
as follows: First, the states in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing 
zone were, for the most part, coastal fishing states, such as Canada, 
Iceland, the Philippines, l{orea , and a number of Latin American 
states, including all of those which have claimed 200-mile exclusive 
fishing rights off their coasts. 
Second, the states opposing the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone were 
predominantly the overseas fishing states, such as the United States, 
the United J(ingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands. A~ supporters of 
the three-1nile limit for the territorial sea, these states \Vere no doubt 
apprehensive that this was a strong entering \Vedge for the outright 
extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, as \vell as being an un war-
ranted deprivation of their long-standing fishing rights. 
Third, the states abstaining were predominantly the Soviet bloc. 
Since Russia and her maritime satellites now claim a 12-mile territorial 
sea, \vhich, of course, includes the right of exclusive fishing, they 
apparently saw no reason to vote on the proposal. One could speculate 
as to other possible reasons \vhy the Soviet bloc abstained. A vote 
against the proposal would have put them uncomfortably on the side 
of the United States, the United J(ingdom, and other states in the 
Free vV or ld bloc. On the other hand, a vote in favor of the 12-mile 
exclusive fishing zone proposal could have been used against them in 
their claims that customary international law supports a 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea because the \Vording of the fishing zone article clearly 
i1nplies that the breadth of the territorial sea is something less than 
12 miles.38 
37 Ibid. The vote in plenary me·etings on the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone 
article was as follows : 
For: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Repub-
lic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
Against: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
Abstain,ing: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Czech-
oslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Holy See, Hungary, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Federa-
tion of Malaya, Norway, Romania, Switz·erland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., 
Republic of Viet-Nam. 
38 The fishing zone article adopted by the First Com1nittee provides : "A State 
has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a limit twelve 
nautical miles from the baseline frmn which the breadth of its territorial sea 
is measured in which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the ex-
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C. THE UNITED STATES COMPROMISE PROPOSAL 
Im1nediately after the defeat of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone 
proposal, the United States compromise proposal for a six-mile ter-
ritorial sea with an additional six-mile zone for exclusive fishing ex-
cept for "historic rights" based upon prior fishing in the area for five 
years 'vas put to a vote. 
Since it came closest ('vi thin 7 votes) to adoption of any of the 
compro1nise proposals, it is desirable to exan1ine it and to analyze the 
vote thereon. 
The United States compromise proposal provided: 
"1. The maximum breadth of the territorial sea of any state 
shall be six miles. 
2. The coastal state shall in a zone having a maximu1n 
breadth of t'velve miles, measured from the applicable base-
line, determined as provided in these rules, have the same 
rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living 
resources o£ the sea as it has in its territorial sea; provided 
that such rights shall be subject to the right of the vessels of 
any state whose vessels have fished regularly in that portion 
of the zone having a continuous baseline and located in the 
same major body of 'vater for the period of five years im-
mediately preceding the signature of this Convention, to fish 
in the outer six miles of that portion of the zone, under obliga-
tion to observe therein such conservation regulations as are 
consistent ·with rules on fisheries adopted by this Conference 
and other rules of international law. 
3. Any dispute 'vith respect to the interpretation or 
application of this article shall, at the request of any party 
to the dispute, be submitted to arbitration unless the parties 
-- agree to another method of peaceful solution. 
4. For the purposes of this Convention the term 'mile' 
1neans a nautical mile ( 'vhich is 1,852 meters), reckoned at 
sixty to one degree of latitude. 
5. As respects the parties thereto, the provisions of para-
graph 2 of this article shall be subject to such bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements, if any, as may exist or be entered 
into. 
ploitation of the living resources of the sea ds it has in its territorial sea" 
(A/OONF. 13/0. 1/L. 168/ Add. 1, Annex (Emphasis added) ) . If the territorial 
sea, which includes the right of exclusive fishing, were not to be considered less 
than twelve miles, then there would be no need to provide for an exclusive fish-
ing zone of 12 miles. Hence, the article clearly implies that the territorial sea 
is conHidered to ue somewhat less than the 12-mile fishing zone. 
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Note: It is proposed that this article be entered into with 
the express understanding that each party to the Convention 
undertakes to consider sympathetically the request of another 
party to consult on the question of whether the rights granted 
by this article are being exercised in such n1anner as to \York 
an inequity upon one or more of the other parties and, if so, 
'vhat measures should and can be taken to remedy the 
situation." 39 
The proposal received the following votes: 
For (45): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Ceylon, 
China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Monaco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdon1, 
United States, Viet-Nam. 
Against ( 33) : 
Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Burn1a, Byelorussia, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan, l{orea, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Poland, 
Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
Abstain (7) : 
Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Finland, Iraq, Japan, Nepal, 
Philippines. 
States voting against the United States compromise proposal may be 
divided into five general categories. The figure or infor1nation in 
parentheses indicates the clain1 to territorial sea and in some cases the 
special limits claimed for fishing. 40 
SOVIET BLOC. (10 votes) : 
Albania (10) 
Bulgaria ( 12) 
Byelorussia (none specified but a Soviet Union republic) 
Czechoslovakia (not specified but dominated by U.S.S.R. even 
though technically an independent state) 
Hungary (12) 
39 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/0. 1/L. 159/Rev. 2. 
40 This information is based upon the U.N. Synoptical Table (APPENDIX I() 
and the summary prepared by Professor Sorensen in Sorensen, op. cit., footnote 
17 (at 244). 
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Poland (3 in 1940, but do1ninated by U.S.S.R. even though tech-
nically an independent state) 
Romania ( 12) 
Ukraine (none specified but a Soviet Union republic) 
U.S.S.R. (12) 
Yugoslavia ( 6, plus 10 n1iles for fishing) 
This so-called Soviet bloc includes a variety of hedfello\vs. On 
the one hand, Byelorussia and Ukraine are Soviet Union republics 
and hence actual parts of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Constitution 
requires that their foreign policy be coordinated by Moscow. The 
others are technically independent states, but their foreign policy 
and internal affairs ar,e dominated in varying degrees by the 
U.S.S.R. 
LATIN AMERICAN STATES (11 votes) : 
Argentina (sea above continental shelf, limit unspecified) 
Chile (200) 
Colombia ( 6 in 1930) 
Ecuador (36) (claim is only 12 miles but reckoned at 20-to-1, 
which is three times usual nautical mile) 
El Salvador (200) 
Gua tern ala ( 12) 
Mexico (9) 
Panama (sea above continental shelf, limit unspecified) 
Peru (200) 
Uruguay (6) 
Venezuela ( 12) 
ARAB STATES (7 votes): 
Jordan (3 in 1956) 
Lebanon ( 6, fishing only) 
~ Libya (12) 
Morocco ( 6, fishing only) 
Saudi Arabia (12) 
Tunisia ( 3, but special limit for fishing to depth of 50 meters) 
United Arab Republic (12) 
ASIATIC STATES (3 votes) : 
Burma (none specified) 
Indonesia ( 12) 
Korea ( 50-60 for fishing) 
OTHERS (2 votes) : 
Canada ( 3, with speciallirr1it of 12 claimed for fishing) 
Iceland ( 4 in 1935 for fishing only, now claims 12) 
If one attempts to analyze the votes of these five groups of states 
against the United States compromise proposal in order to appraise 
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the prospects of achieving a favorable two-thirds vote on the same or 
a similar proposal at a future Conference the results are far £ro1n 
encouragn1g. 
With respect to the Russian bloc of 10 votes, since all of these states 
except Yugoslavia are either committed to a 12-Inile territorial sea 
or so do1ninated by the U.S.S.R. that they dare not vote for anything 
else, it is not likely that any of these votes ·will change. 
It is true that Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito has sp_o,vn consider-
able independence from Soviet domination. Ho-wever, while she 
claims a territorial sea of only six miles as compared \vith the 12-mile 
claim of n1ost o£ the Soviet bloc, she has claimed an exclusive fishing 
zone of 10 miles since 1950 prin1arily to exclude Italians from fishing 
ne,ar the Yugoslav shores in the upper Adriatic Sea \vhere t he fishery 
resources close to the Yugoslav coast are much richer than those on 
the Italian side. Of course, if the question of the breadth of the terri-
torial sea could be divor<;ed from the question of coastal fisheries, it is 
barely possible that Yugoslavia n1ight vote for a six-mile territorial 
sea, \V hich she herself no\v proclaims. 
Of the eleven Latin American States voting against the United 
States compron1ise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea, ony t\vo-
Colombia and Uruguay-claim as little as six 1niles.41 All of the 
others claim t\velve to t\vo hundred 1niles except Mexico, \vhich clai1ns 
nine miles.42 Colo1nbia's claim to a six-mile territorial sea goes back 
to 1930, but she has also clai1ned a 12-mile fishing zone :for much longer 
(since 1923) .43 
Eleven Latin American States voted for the 12-mile fishing zone in 
the plenary 1neetings,44 even though the proposal failed to get the req-
uisite t\vo-thirds majority, indicating their strong desire for a Inini-
mum exclusive fishing zone of at least that distance. In addition 
three of these Latin American States-Colombia, Mexico and V ene-
zuela-joined \Vith five other states in what came to be known as the 
eight-po\ver proposal which \vould have pern1itted a coastal state to 
fix the territorial sea up to twelve miles and \Vhich \vould have granted 
exclusive fishing rights of twelve miles even though the territorial 
sea might be proclaimed at less than that distance.45 This proposal 
lost in plenary meetings by a vote of 39 in favor, 38 against, with 8 ab-
stentions.46 
41 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 11 (1958), (APPENDIX K) 
~Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 2 Official Rec01~ds (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 
45 Ibid., at 128 
46 Ibid., at 40. 
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It should be emphasized that, although these eleven Latin American 
States voted against the United States compromise proposal, as did 
the Soviet bloc, they ·were not in any sense subservient to or dominated 
by the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, when the Soviet proposal, -vv hich 
'vould have granted each state the right to establish a territorial sea 
"within the limits, as a rule, of three to twelve miles" with no reference 
to exclusive fisheries rights,47 was voted on in the plenary n1eeting 
shortly after the defeat of the United States compromise proposal, all 
but three of these eleven Latin American states voted in the negative. 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru, principal claimants of a 200-mile territorial 
sea, voted in favor of the Soviet proposal which was resoundingly de-
feated by 21 in favor, 47 against with 17 abstentions.48 However, the 
vote of these three Latin American states was not so much a vote in 
favor of the Soviet proposal as it was .an affirmation of the position 
which they have maintained for several years and which they enunci-
ated again in a three-party declaration near the end of the conference 
for "the establishment and extension of a more just regime of the sea 
that will safeguard effectively the recog;nized speeial right of the 
coastal States to defend their economy and the livelihood of their 
populations." 4 & -
With one or two possible exceptions, it is doubtful that any of these 
eleven Latin American States 'vill change their 1958 vo.tes and in the 
future either abstain from voting or vote in favor of a territorial sea 
of six miles or less. Again, ho,vever, it should be emphasized that if 
the coastal fisheries question could be settled separately from the ter-
ritorial sea question, it might be possible that several of these states 
"\Vould vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less. For ex-
an1ple, the Argentine delegate indicated that his country had voted 
in First Committee for a six-mile territorial sea in the hope that a 
uniform international rule -vvould result, but that Argentina felt coin-
pelled to vote against the United States proposal because of its pro-
visions reserving historic fishing rights in the outer six miles. 50 
In the case of the seven Arab States which voted against the United 
States proposal, the pr~evious tabulation indicates that three now· claim 
a territorial sea of 12 miles, two claim six m]les (for fishing only), and 
two claim three miles. While there were undoubtedly a number of 
reasons why these seven states voted as they did, it seems safe to say 
that one of the principal reasons was to prevent Israel from having an 
outlet to the "high seas" of the Gulf of Aqaba. Since the Gulf is only 
about fifteen miles at its 'videst point, a claim by the littoral Arab states 
47 Ibid., at 126. 
48 Ibid., at 40. 
49 Ibid., at 132. 
50 Ibid., at 42. 
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to territorial seas of 12 miles (or even to nine miles) 'vould mean that 
Israel, located at the narrow head of the Bay, would have to traverse 
the territorial seas of Arab states for more than 100 miles from her 
own port of Elath to reach the high seas of the Red Sea. 51 
While it is true that Israel would have the right of innocent passage 
from her port through the territorial seas of the Arab States under 
Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone, 52 it would be possible for the Arab States to hinder or even 
deny such passage to Israeli ships on the ground that such passage 
was not innocent but "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security 
of the coastal State." 53 
Because of the particular interests of these Arab states in relation 
to Israel, coupled with the desire of most of them to extend their terri-
torial seas in order to achieve additional exclusive fishing rights at 
least up to twelve miles,54 it is difficult to imagine that more than one 
or possibly two will soon change their votes from negative to affirma-
tive on a proposal calling ·for a territorial sea of six miles or less. 
One slender reed of encourage1nent in the case o£ Lebanon, which 
claims a six-mile territorial sea for fishing only, is the fact that after 
voting against the United States compromise proposal, she also voted 
against the Soviet proposal 55 which in effect approved the unilateral 
establishment of a ,12-mile territorial sea. Moreover, Lebanon 
abstained when it came to voting on the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone 
article. These facts suggest the possibility that Lebanon might be 
51 Of course, Saudi Arabia has taken the position that the Gulf of Aqaba is a 
national inland waterway, subject to absolute Arab sovereignty. General As-
sembly, 12th Sess. Official Records, 697 Plenary Meeting (A/P.V. 697, 233) (Oct. 
2, 1957). If this position were to prevail, which seems unlikely in view of the 
substantial views to the contrary, it would be possible for the Arab States to 
prevent Israel's access to the high seas of the Red Sea without extending their 
territorial seas. See Selak, "A Consideration of the Legar Status of the Gulf of 
Aqaba," 52 A.J.I.L. 660 (1958). 
52 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, Art. 14 (2) (1958). This article provides: 
" Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either of 
traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal 
waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters." 
53 Ibid., Art 14 ( 4). 
54 Six of the seven Arab States voted in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing 
zone, and the s·eventh (Lebanon) abstained. 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 
39 (1958)). 
55 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 40 (1958)). The exact language of the 
Soviet proposal relative to Article 3 was: "Each State shall determine the breadth 
of its territorial waters in accordance with established practice within the limits, 
as a rule, of three to twelve miles, having regard to historical and geographical 
conditions, economic interests, the interests of the security of the coastal State 
and the interests of international navigation." U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 30 
(1958). 
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persuaded to vote for a 6-mile territorial sea which, of course, would 
include exclusive fishing in said area, consistent with her present uni-
lateral claim of that distance, if proposals relative to exclusive fish-
ing rights beyond a six-mile territorial sea were treated separately. 
The three Asiatic States voting against the United States com-
promise proposal-Burma, Indonesia, and Korea-all appear to favor 
a territorial sea of 12 miles or more, primarily because of strong inter-
ests in securing exclusive fishing rights up to this distance or beyond. 
All three voted in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone article 
which was adopted by the First Committee.56 Moreover, two of the 
three (Burma and Indonesia) voted in :favor of the Soviet proposal 
which, as previously indicated, would have approved unilateral claims 
to a territorial sea up to twelve miles, thus establishing this figure as 
the breadth. 
Korea voted against the Soviet proposal, as might have been 
predicted in vie'v of her claim in 1952 to broad exclusive fisheries zones 
off her coasts and sovereignty over the continental shelf and super-
jacent waters to a distance of fifty to sixty miles from shore, despite 
assertions that the claim did not effect an extension of the territorial 
sea.57 Since Japan, with one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, 
has long maintained that the three-mile territorial sea is a firmly 
established principle of international law, the claims of Korea to 
exclusive fishing for the distances claimed have put the two states in 
direct conflict. 
Here again, if Burma, Indonesia and Korea are to be persuaded to 
vote for a territorial sea of six miles or less, the coastal fisheries 
problem will have to be resolved. 
With respect to Iceland, again we find a close linkage of the ter-
ritorial sea breadth and the coastal fisheries problem. Although for 
approximately two centuries (from 1662 to 1859) Iceland claimed 
exclusive fishery limits of 16 miles, in 1901 the Danish and British 
Governments entered into an agreement specifying three miles for 
fisheries and 10 miles for bays.58 At the Hague Conference in 1930 
the delegate from Iceland in an informal expression of views as to 
the proper breadth of the territorial sea supported four miles.59 In 
1952 Iceland formally extended her territorial sea for exclusive fish-
ing to four miles, 60 although she has argued in favor of the right to 
56 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/0. 1/L. 168/Add. 1, Annex. 
57 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 23 ~at 466). 
58 Ibid., at 466. Also see comments of Iceland to the International Law 
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/ON. 4/99/Add. 2, 8. 
59 Francois, "Report of the Second Committee (Territorial Sea)" 24 A.J.I.L. 
Supp., ANNEX III 253 (1930). 
80 MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 23 (at 466). 
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1nuch greater exclusive fishing in the superjacent waters of her con-
t inental shelf. 61 The 1952 claim to four miles brought a prompt 
protest from the United Kingdom, including the closing of British 
ports to the landing of fish from Icelandic trawlers. 62 
Shortly after the Geneva Conference of 1958 failed to reach agree-
Inent on the breadth of the territorial sea, Iceland extended her claim 
of exclusive fishing rights to twelve miles, without extending her ter-
ritorial sea as such. This claim met with widespread protest, includ-
ing that of the United ICingdom ·which began protecting her trawlers 
'vith naval ships between the four and twelve-mile limits. 63 
The coastal fisheries problem of Iceland is unique in that fishing is 
such an important part of her economy, more so than in any other 
state. Fish constitutes 14% of her total domestic production and 96% 
of her total exports. 64 These facts, together with the evidence of over-
fishing off Iceland's coasts,65 suggest not only the need for conserva-
t ion measures as provided in the Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,66 but also 
the possible need to grant Iceland preferential, or perhaps even exclu-
sive, fishing rights in a limited area of high seas adjacent to her coasts. 
At the 1958 Conference Iceland introduced the following proposal 
to take care of her special circumstances: 
"In exceptional circumstances, where a people is primarily 
dependent on its coastal fisheries for its livelihood and/ or 
economic development, the State concerned has the right to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fisheries up to the 
necessary distance from the coast in view of relevant local 
considerations." 67 
In the comment which followed this proposal it was suggested by 
Iceland that a zone of twelve miles would go a long way toward taking 
care of her requirements but that it might be necessary to have an 
81 II Verbatin Record (A/CONF. 13/19, 301-303 (1957)). In 1948 Iceland 
passed a law providing for the scientific conservation of her continental shelf 
fisheries. 1 U.N. L eg. Series 12 (1951). 
62 Sorensen, op. cit., footnote 17 (at 251). 
63 For the exchange of notes between the Icelandic and British Governments 
regarding the 12-mile claim of Iceland, see Lauterpacht, "The Contemporary 
Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law-Survey and 
Comment," 8 International and Comparative Lww Quarterly 175-181 (1959). 
64 U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 13, "The Economic Importance of the Sea Fisheries in 
Different Countries," A/CONF. 13/16,3, 9 (1957). 
65 For a recent comment see New York Titm.es, Nov. 8, 1959, p. 12, col. 1. 
66 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and Add. 1 (1958). 
67 3 Official Records (A/CONF.13/39, 246 (1958) ) . 
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additional zone beyond t\velve miles in \vhich Iceland \voulJ. hav~. 
priority rights. 68 
Although the Iceland proposal has considerable merit because of the 
importance of fishing to her total economy, it failed to \vin approval 
at the Conference. Ho,vever, the Convention on Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the I-Iigh Seas did recognize that the 
coastal state has a special interest in the n1aint·enance of the produc-
tivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to 
its territorial sea,69 and may adopt unilateral measures of conservation 
under certain circumstances. 70 The Convention also provides :for 
compulsory settlement of disputes \vhich arise over fishing and 
conservation. 71 
Although Iceland voted against the United States co1npromise pro-
posal of a six-mile territorial sea,72 she did so primarily because of her 
objection to the provision for "historic fishing rights" in the outer 
six 1niles of a t\velve-mile zone. Iceland \vants a 12-Inile zone of ex-
clusive fisheries, nothing less. She voted in favor of the 12-mile ex-
clusive fishing provision (Art. 3) of the First Com1nittee,73 and also 
for the Soviet compromise proposal granting approval of a. territorial 
sea up to 12 miles. 74 
Yet, Iceland has indicated that she \Vould not press for an extension 
of the territorial sea beyond three miles, provided she could secure ex-
clusive fishing rights in a t\velve-mile zone.75 Hence, it may be possible 
to win Iceland's vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less 
if the coastal fisheries problem can be resolved separately. 
The same is true of Canada whose interest in as narrow a territorial 
sea as possible, preferably three miles, has been referred to above. But 
Canada, like Iceland, wants a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone, 76 even 
though the relative importance of fisheries to Canada's total economy 
is far less than in the case of Iceland. Canada's sea fishery landings 
68 Ibid. 
69 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and Add 1, Art. 6 (1958). 
70 Ibid., at Art. 7. 
71 Ibid., at Art. 9. 
72 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 
73 Ibid. 
u Ibid., at 40. 
75 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 185 (1958)). 
7
n Hamilton, "Report on Law of the Sea Conference'' (Statement in the Cana-
dian House of Commons, July 25, 1958), External Affairs, No. 8, 195 (August 
1958). Hamilton said in part, " ... [I]n the final analysis the central issue 
before the Conference was not whether there should be a fishing zone but 
whether it should be subject to existing traditional rights as proposed by the 
United States or whether it should be exclusive and without impediment as pro-
posed by Canada." 
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are less than one per cent of her aggregate do1nestic product, and only 
three per cent of her total exports. 77 
Here again it seems safe to assert that if the coastal fisheries ques-
tion could be resolved separately from the question o:f the territorial 
sea breadth, Canada would favor a three-mile limit or be "\villing to 
compromise on a six-mile limit. 
Having analyzed briefly the vote of the 33 states which opposed the 
United States proposal to see whether and under what circumstances 
some of these states might be persuaded to vote at the 1960 Conference 
for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less, we turn now to a sun1-
mary consideration of the seven states which abstained from voting-
Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Finland, Iraq, Japan, Nepal, and the Phil-
Ippines. 
It will be observed that two of these states are land-locked-Af-
ghanistan and Nepal. Notwithstanding this fact, they have as great 
an interest in the maximum freedom of the seas as do coastal states, 
an interest which was recognized in a number of "\Vays at the Confer-
ence. For example, a separate committee was established to study 
the question of :free access to the sea of land -locked countries, 78 and in 
the Convention on the High Seas the list of freedoms is explicitly made 
applicable both for coastal and non-coastal States.79 
Although the immediate and paramount interest of land -locked 
states tends to center on the matter of overland access through neigh-
boring states to the sea, the representative of Afghanistan appropri-
ately formulated the broad perspective when he said, 
"Our life today is interdependent, and all nations 'vhether 
maritime or land-locked have built their economic life in such 
a way that through the sea they obtain their urgent needs and 
requirements. No land-locked country can live alone and be 
self-sufficient without relying on sea transportation." 80 
Because of the interest of Afghanistan and Nepal as land-locked 
states in the maximum freedom of the seas, if other considerations such 
as the fear of offending dominant neighboring st3tes which 'vere op-
posed to the u·nited States proposal could be neutralized, it seems 
likely that such states could be persuaded to vote for a narrow terri-
to rial sea, despite the fact that some of these states have indicated 
a "cautious attitude" toward the question.81 
11 U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 13 (A/CONF. 13/16, 2, 6 (1958)). 
78 7 Official Record8 (A/CONF. 13/43 (1958)). 
79 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958). 
80 I Verbatim Record (A/CONF. 13/19, 513 (1957)). 
81 See statement of the delegate from Nepal in the First Committee 3 Official 
Record8 (A/CONF. 13/39, 186 (1958)). 
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Of the five other abstaining states, Japan has long been an advocate 
o:f a three-mile ter ritor ial sea because o£ her overriding interest in the 
maximum f reedom of the high seas both for navigation and fishing. 
Although Japan abstained from voting on the United States proposal, 
she did show her willingness to compromise her long-standing ad-
herence to the three-mile limit by voting in the First Committee for 
the first hal£ of the Canadian proposal to establish a six- mile limit.82 
But, she voted against the second half of the Canadian proposal which 
·would have provided exclusive fishing rights in the outer six miles of 
a 12-mile zone. Despite her desire to suppor t the United States in 
her efforts to achieve agreement on the narrowest possible territorial 
sea, Japan abstained on the United States proposal because she could 
not vote for that part which provided exclusive fishing to the coastal 
state in the outer six miles of a 12-mile zone except for "historic r ights" 
based upon five years of prior fishing. This provision meant that J a-
pan, and other overseas fishing states, would be forever precluded fro1n 
fishing in these exclusive, outer-six-mile zones if they had not fished 
there recently (i.e., within the past five years), a crippling prohibition 
to Japan's large and vital fishing interests. 
Finland has a territorial sea of four miles, a limit "'•vhich she has 
favored for many years.83 It is not easy to account for her abstention 
on the United States proposal although one may note her consistency 
in abstaining on most of the proposals regarding breadth of the terri-
torial sea. She did so in the First Committee on both parts o£ the 
Canadian proposal,84 and in the plenary n1eetings on the 12-mile exclu-
sive fishing zone,85 the eight-power proposal,86 and the Soviet pro-
posal.87 The Scylla and Charybdis for Finland may well be her :fr iend-
ship for the United States on the one hand and her physical proximity 
to the Soviet Union on the other. Under these circumstances, the 
safest prediction as to her vote on this issue is another abstention, with 
an outside chance for a vote in favor of a narrow territorial sea of six 
1niles or less. 
Costa Rica, also abstaining on the United States proposal, has fol-
lowed the lead of Chile, Ecuador and Peru in claiming a n1ar itime zone 
82 3 Official Records (A/CONF.13/39, 176 (1958)). 
83 Finland indicated a preference for a four-mile lilnit at the Hague Conference 
of 1930 but expressed a willingness to vote for three with the recognition of a 
contiguous zone. Reeves, op. cit., footnote 11 (at 486, 499'). 
84 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 176, 177 (1958) ). 
85 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 




of 200 rniles,88 but has emphasized that this claim in no ·way implies 
an assertion of a territorial sea of that distance.89 Moreover, during 
the Conference she did not vote consistently ·with those three coun-
tries. F or example, although she voted 'vith the1n in favor of the 
12-mile exclusive fishing zone,90 she "\Vas opposed to them in voting 
against the Soviet proposal authorizing coastal states to establish a 
territorial sea at any distance bet,veen three and twelve miles.91 
Costa R ica has described a territorial sea of three miles as an 
"anachronism consistent neither 'vith the advances of modern tech-
nique nor 'vith methods of exploiting marine resources which have 
been employed in the modern world." 92 That the control of coastal 
fisheries resources is one of the major concerns of Costa Rica, rather 
than the breadth of the territorial sea as such, is indicated by the 
follo,ving assertion: 
"What the Government of Costa Rica "\Vants is to secure 
the recognition of its competence and jurisdiction to regulate 
and control the manner in 'vhich the living resources o:f the 
sea are exploited in the n1aritime zones adjacent to its coasts, 
lest the abusive exploitation of these resources lead to their 
depletion or exhaustion. We consider that Costa Rica, as a 
coastal State, has a prior interest in these resources .... " 93 
T hus, the Costa Rica position suggests that if the coastal fisheries 
problem can be resolved separately, she might be persuaded to vote for 
a territorial sea of six miles or less. 
Iraq has claimed a territorial sea in accordance 'vith international 
law without specifying a breadth. Since she voted against the first part 
of the Canadian proposal to establish a territorial sea of six miles,94 and 
voted for the eight-po,ver proposal,95 as "\Vell as the Soviet proposal,96 
both of which would have permitted the establishment of a 12-mile 
territorial sea, perhaps the most that can be hoped for in a future con-
ference is her abstention on the establishment of a territorial sea of six 
n1iles or less, with the remote possibility of a vote for such a proposal. 
The Philippines, the last of the seven states abstaining on the United 
States compromise proposal for a six-mile territorial sea, claims that 
88 For a sum.mary statement of the developments in Costa Rica which indicate 
that the situation with respect to her exact claims in regard to territorial sea and 
fishing zones is not at all clear, see MacChesney, op. cit., footnote 23. (at 451). 
89 1 V erbatim Record (A/CONF. 13/19, 468 (1957)). 
90 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (19,58)). 
91 Ibid., at 40 
92 2 Verbatim Record (A/CONF. 13/19, 469 (1957) ). 
ga Ibid., at 470. 
94 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 176 (1958)). 
95 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 
98 Ibid.~ at 40. 
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the posi6on of archipelagic nations calls :for special treatlnent. She 
introduced a proposal in the First Committee 'vhich would have ap-
plied the method of straight baselines to archipelagos, as \veil as to 
coasts which are deeply indented,97 by permitting the drawing of base-
lines along the coast of the outermost islands, follo,ving the general 
configuration of the group, where the islands are sufficiently close to 
one another as to form a eompact \Vhole and have been historically 
considered collectively as a single unit.98 
The general statements of the Philippine representative in the Gen-
eral .. A.ssembly prior to the Conference to the effect that security and 
economic reasons \Varrant an extension of the territorial sea,99 and her 
vote against the first part of the Canadian proposal to establish a six-
Inile territorial sea 100 and in favor of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone 
proposal,101 all see1n to suggest that the Philippines cannot be per-
suaded to vote for a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less unless 
the coastal fishing problem is settled separately. 
D. SEPARATION OF DELIMITATION OF TERRITORIAL SEA 
FROM COASTAL FISHERIES PROBLEM 
Suppose the question of the delimitation of the territorial sea 
were separated from the question of coastal fisheries, is it likely that 
the necessary two-thirds vote could be secured in a future conference 
on a six-mile or narrower limit? 
This is a difficult question to answer. One might hastily conclude 
that agreement on as narrow a limit as six miles, quite apart from the 
coastal fisheries question, is doubtful on the basis of the vote in the 
First Committee of the 1958 c ·onference when the first part of the 
revised Canadjan proposal calling for a six-mile territorial sea was 
resoundingly defeated with only 11 votes in favor, 48 against, with 23 
abstentions.102 
Yet it should be stressed that the vote on this part of the Canadian 
proposal in 1958 was not at all indicative of the general sentiment 
of a majority of the states towards compromising on a six-mile ter-
ritorial sea as demonstrated later in the Conference when the United 
States proposal which, like the Canadian proposal, also embodied a 
six-mile territorial sea, came within seven votes of achieving the 
necessary two-thirds majority. Nor is the vote on th~ first part of the 
97 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 52, Art. (4) (1) (1958). 
98 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 98 (1958). This proposal was withdrawn 
without being voted upon. 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 148 (19~58)). 
00 1 Verbatirn Record (A/CONF.13/19, 218 (1958)). 
100 3 0 fficial Records ( A/CONF. 13/39, 176 ( 19,58) ) . 
101 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 39 (1958)). 
102 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13!/39, 177 (1958)). 
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Canadian proposal in 1958 necessarily indicative of what a future 
Conference might vote on a similar delimination of the territorial sea, 
especially if the states can be persuaded to treat the matter of delimita-
tion separately from the coastal fisheries problem. 
The problem is really two-fold: (1) whether the states will be 
disposed to decide the question of the breadth o:£ the territorial sea 
separately :from the question of coastal fisheries; and (2) whether 
they will agree on a territorial sea o:£ six miles, or less, without first 
having arrived at an agreement on the extent of preferential and/or 
exclusive fishing rights to be granted to the coastal state in a con-
tiguous zone beyond the territorial sea. 
With respect to the second problem, which is the more difficult, the 
delegate from Iceland probably expressed the views of a number of 
states when he indicated that his delegation had voted against the 
first part of the Canadian proposal to establish a six-mile territorial 
sea because at that stage in the Conference the coastal state's exclusive 
fishing rights up to twelve miles had not yet been voted upon/03 in-
dicating an insistence on the settlement of the coastal fisheries problem 
first. 
Since it is felt by many states that the easiest way to get additional 
exclusive fishing rights is to claim an extension of the territorial sea, 
not,vithstanding a general recognition of the validity of the pronounce-
ment in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Oase that "the delimitation 
of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent 
1nerely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal 
law," 104 there is a reluctance to agree upon a narrow territorial sea 
of six miles or less without first knowing at least what the general pat-
tern of agreement is likely to be with respect to preferential or ex-
clusive coastal fishing rights. Some states, such as Iceland, appear to 
demand a specific agreement guaranteeing exclusive fishing to the 
coastal state, prior to a determination of the delimitation of the ter-
ritoria.I sea. . 
Relative to the first problem above of separating the question of the 
breadth o:f the territorial sea from the question of coastal fisheries, Mr. 
Dean, head of the United States delegation, vigorously opposed a 
Canadian motion that the United States proposal be voted on in two 
parts, as had been done with the Canadian proposal. He said that 
the United States delegation was not prepared to support any proposal 
establishing the breadth of the territorial sea at six miles unless it 
103 Ibid., at 185. 
104 I.O.J. Reports, 132 (1951). The Court went on to say, "Although it is true 
that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the 
coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with 
regard to other States depends upon international law." 
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included the other essential elements of the proposal 105 (i.e., inclusion 
of the "historic rights" provision to insure that the United States and 
other overseas fishing states could continue to fish in the outer six-mile 
"exclusive" zone). Dean's position undoubtedly reflected the pressures 
of certain influential fishing interests, both in the United States and 
in other states. 
Thus, the voting on the separate question of a six-mile territorial sea 
'vas taken on the Canadian proposal in the First Committee at a time 
'vhen the United States, one of the leading exponents later in the Con-
ference of a compromise at six miles, and several other states were un-
willing to consider the breadth of the territorial sea apart from the 
coastal fisheries question. In the interest of achieving the narrowest 
possible territorial sea it is hoped that the United States and other 
states may ehange their views on this matter. Therein lies the only 
hope of avoiding another deadlock such as the one which developed in 
the 1958 Conference. 
Assuming that a significant number of states will be unwilling to 
commit themselves to a narrow territorial sea of six miles or less 
'vithout first having some assurance that their demands for preferen-
tial and/or exclusive fishing rights in an area beyond a narrow terri-
torial sea will be recognized, (an assumption which seems warranted 
in light of the 1958 Conference record), what form might this as-
surance take without the danger of reaching an impasse over specific 
details~ 
E. SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR HIGH SEAS AND COASTAL 
FISHERIES 
It is suggested that agreement might be had upon a general state-
Inent of three complementary principles with respect to high seas and 
coastal fisheries, prior to and quite apart from any discussion of the 
delimitation of the territorial sea. These principles are as follows: 
I. Principle I: Basic Right to Fish on the High Seas 
All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on 
the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations and (b) to prin-
ciples which have as their purpose the recognition of the special rights 
of coastal states to preferential or exclusive fishing rights in lin1ited 
areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts beyond the territorial 
sea. 
Commentary 
This first principle recognizes the freedom of high seas fishing as a 
basic, traditional right. It has been incorporated in t~e provisions of 
105 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 179 (1958)). 
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..._1\_rticle 2 of the Convention on the High Seas 106 and Article 1 of the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas.107 
In the principles which follo,;v, it ·will be seen that this basic, first 
principle, long-recognized in International Law, is not absolute but 
is subject to certain limitations in order to recognize the desirability 
of providing coastal states with (a) preferential fishing rights in 
limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts ai~d (b) exclusive 
fishing rights in still narrower areas in those exceptional cases in "\vhich 
the coastal state is primarily dependent upon its coastal fisheries for 
its economic livelihood. 
2. Principle II: Preferential Fishing Rights for Coastal States 
in Limited Areas 
All coastal states have the right for their nationals to engage in fish-
ing in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts on a 
preferential basis subject to the "historic rights" of overseas states 
'Nhich have fished in such areas during a designated period immedi-
ately preceding the effective date of a Convention on Coastal 
Fisheries. 
Commentary 
The purpose of this second principle is to accord to the coastal state 
a preference to fish in a limited area of the high seas adjacent to its 
coast while at the same time balancing this preferential treatment 'vith 
Principle I which recognizes the traditional rights of all states to fish 
in the high seas. The preferential fishing zone contemplated under 
this principle would accord overseas fishing states the right to con-
tinue fishing for the same classes o£ fish up to an amount not exceed-
ing the average annual catch over a designated prior period of, say, 
five or ten years. 
In the formulation of the principle of preferential fishing rights 
for the coastal state, 'vith due provision for the "historic rights" of 
overseas states, it is unnecessary to incorporate 'vithin the principle 
itself an exact period of time (i.e., 5 years, 10 years, etc.) as the basis 
for determining which states have fished in an area sufficiently long 
to have established an "historic right" to continue fishing there, and 
for calculating the average annual catch which the overseas state may 
not exceed in the future. The details of the time period can be resolved 
by agreement later; the first and most important step is to establish 
the broad principle. 
106 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr.1 (1958). 
107 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 54 and Add. 1 (1958). 
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However, three comments 1nay be of some help in the :future in 
detern1ining ·what the ti1ne period should be, assuming that a time 
period is used as the basis :for establishing "historic rights." 108 
First, it is :felt that the period should not be shorter than five years 
because a st ate which has fished in a given area for less than that length 
of time can hardly be said to have established "historic fishing rights" 
therein. Secondly, since the :facts 1nay sho'v that overseas states do not 
fish regularly each year in a given area, it 1nay be that the follo"Ting 
type of formula would be :fairer: "historic fishing rights" shall be ac-
corded to any state vvhich has fished in a given coastal area for a cer-
tain stock, or stocks, of fish during any five (or seven or eight) years 
out of the past ten (or tvvelve or fifteen). Thirdly, it n1ay be some-
'vhat indicative of the :favorable attitude of n1any states to,vard the 
five-year criterion on this question of "historic rights" to remember 
that the United States compromise proposal at the Geneva Conference 
in 1958, which came within seven votes of adoption, contained a five-
year period as the basis for determining "historic rights." In an 
earlier proposal at the Conference, the United States had suggested a 
ten-year period. 
\Vhereas in the high seas beyond the preferential fishing zone adj a-
cent to the coasts all states vvould have equal fishing rights, except to 
the extent that they may have agreed other,vise under conservation 
treaties, within the preferential fishing zone the overseas states 'voulcl 
have 1nore lilnited rights and yet 'vould not be subject to con1plete ex-
clusion by the coastal state as would be the case under Principle III 
belovv. 
The principle of preferential fishing rights vvould make it possible 
for the coastal state to increase its catch over the years as the fishing 
stocks increased, but the overseas fishing state vvould be restricted to a 
maximum tonnage based upon the annual average catch over the 
design a ted period. 
It will be noted under this principle that the coastal state is granted 
preferential rights in three important vvays : ( 1) preference as to an 
area, ( 2) preference as to time, and ( 3) preference as to total catch. 
( 1) Preference as to an area. Admittedly the granting of preferen-
tial fishing rights to the coastal state in an area of .the high seas is a 
derogation from the basic, traditional principle of freedom of fishing 
108 Volume of catch of a particular stock in relation to the total catch of all 
states in a given area would be another basis which might, after careful stucly, be 
considered superior to the time period for determining "historic rights" to fish 
and for calculating the average annual catch. However, th~ time period sug-
gested here has the decided advantage of simplicity. 
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on the high seas no'v more than three centuries old.109 However, this 
derogation recognizes the emerging demands of coastal states for some-
'vhat greater fishing rights in their coastal waters founded upon eco-
nomic and other considerations, without going so far as to destroy a 
part of the basic principle of freedom of high seas fishing entirely. It 
should be emphasized that most of the recent demands of coastal states 
have been for emclusive fishing rights beyond the territorial sea. Many 
of these claims to exclusive fishing rights, particularly the ones of the 
South .._~merican States claiming sovereignty up to the incredible 
200 miles fron1 shore, have no legal, economic, social or moral 
j ustification. 110 
Also, the for1nulation of the principle of preferential fishing rights 
in a limited area of the high seas adjacent to the coastal state is an 
attempt to break the impasse which has developed, and which gives 
unfortunate promise of continuing, between the coastal states which 
demand broad zones of emclusive fishing rights, and the overseas fish-
ing states "\vhich insist upon the absolute freedom of fishing outside of 
a three mile territorial sea. Regrettably and yet necessarily the over-
seas states sometimes feel compelled to enforce such insistence by hav-
ing "\Varships accompany fishing vessels.111 
This principle "\Vhich recognizes preferential fishing rights for the 
coastal state is a n1iddle ground "\vhich, it is hoped, will make it pos-
sible for coastal fishing states and overseas fishing states to reach an 
equitable compromise of their extreme positions. 
(2) Preference as to ti1ne. The coastal state is granted a preference 
as to time in that its nationals may fish in the preferential zone for 
any class of fish even though they 1nay not have fished there before, 
or at least not "\vithin the designated base period which is required 
for overseas states in order for them to establish their "historic fish-
ing rights." This time preference may be of great importance to (a) 
long-established coastal states which have done little or no fishing 
in the preferential zone for particular stocks of fish, and (b) for the 
109 Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under International Law 15 
(1942) ; Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 3-5 (2nd ed. 1950) ; Colombos, 
The International Law of the Sea 39-54 (3rd rev. ed. 1954) ; Potter, The Freedom, 
of the Seas 1-96 (1924). 
110 l\1cDougal and Burke, op. cit., footnote 25 (at 539). 
111 For an account of a recent incident involving Iceland and the United 
Kingdom, see Lauterpacht, op. cit., footnote 63 (at 146, 177). 
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host of emerging ne\v coastal states which ·will be assured of pr1or 
rights for their limited, but emerging fisheries industries.112 
( 3) Preference as to total catch. Perhaps the n1ost important 
feature of the preferential principle for the coastal state is the op-
portunity afforded to increase its catch within the preferential zone in 
the future, no matter what its catch has been in the past. By contrast, 
overseas states ·would have their future catches li1nited both as to 
amount and as to a particular class or stock of fish, the li1nit being 
determined by the average annual catch over the designated base 
period. 
In addition, the principle of the preferential fishing zone for coastal 
states suggested above would include a recognition of the right of the 
coastal state to adopt unilateral conservation measures, pending an 
agreement between the various stateB fishing in the preferential zone, 
along the lines provided in Article 7 of the Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources o£ the High Seas.113 
It is not proposed that the coastal state 'vould be accorded preferen-
tial treatment in the sense of being able to dictate or do1ninate the 
establishment of conservation measures. But the coastal state would 
be able to act, in case an impasse developed, to conserve stocks of fish 
until the matter could be settled by negotiation, arbitration or some 
other peaceful means. 
Also, it should be noted that the coastal state's preferential rights 
might, in exceptional cases, develop into exclusive rights under the 
principle enunciated below, although it is not expected that this 'vould 
occur in many instances. 
3. Principle lll: In Exceptional Cases, Exclusive Fishing Rights 
for Coastal States 
A coastal state shall have the right for their nationals to engage in 
fishing in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to their coasts on an 
exc7Jusive basis in the exceptional case in which that state is prin~arily 
dependent upon its coastal fisheries for its economic livelihood. 
Commentary 
This principle is the antithesis of Principle I which recognizes the 
basic right of all states to fish in the high seas. It is based upon a 
recognition that in a few unusual and exceptional cases, the total 
economy of the coastal state is so overwheln1ingly dependent upon its 
coastal fisheries as to justify this extren1e departure from the three-
112 For a list of the more than forty independent, or semi-independent, states 
established since World War II, many of which are maritime states, see 
Appendix M. 
113 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l3/L 54 and Add.l (1958). 
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century old principle of freedom of the high seas for fishing. This 
dependence may be reflected in various ways, such as (a) the high 
n1onetary value of the coastal fisheries catch in relation to the total 
domestic production of the state, and (b) the high percentage of ex-
ports o:f fish products to total exports. Other tests could be devised to 
detern1ine 'vhether the coastal state should be entitled to exclusive fish-
ing r ights in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to its coasts. 
These exclusive fishing areas for a few states in most, if not all, cases 
ought to be narro,ver than those in 'vhich all other coastal states vvould 
enjoy preferential fishing rights in order to provide for the minimum 
encroaclunent on the basic principle (No. I) of freedom of fishing for 
all states beyond a narrovv territorial sea. 
It will be noted that specific breadths for the preferential zone and, 
in exceptional cases, the exclusive zone, have not been suggested. This 
omission was not inadvertent. Too often in the past attention has been 
narrowly focused on the details of proposals to solve the coastal 
fisheries problem (as well as the problem of delimiting the territorial 
sea and other internation.allaw problems) vvithout first formulating a 
broad theoretical concept which takes full, objective account o£ (a) the 
vvorld community values at stake, (b) the conditions in the world 
vvhich suggest possible alternative courses of action in order to maxi-
mize those values for the greatest number of states, and (c) the pos-
sible effects of alternative courses of action. 
For the above reason, the emphasis here has been upon the formula-
tion of a set of principles, vvide-spread adoption of which it is sub-
lnitted would constitute a long step toward underwriting an equitable 
and just solution of the coastal fisheries problem. 
( l) Summary and Conclusion 
Under the three complementary principles set forth above, the tvvo 
providing for (a) preferential, and (b) in exceptional cases, exclusi1;e 
fishing rights in limited areas of the high seas adjacent to coastal 
states vvould novv fully recognize the economic and social conditions 
vvhich underlie the e1nerging demands of states vvith respect to their 
coastal fisheries. Admittedly these tvvo nevv principles constitute a 
significant departure from the traditional, universally-recognized 
principle of freedo1n o:f fishing in the high seas vvhich was most re-
cently incorporated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 
It is vvorthy o:f special note here that, by contrast vvith the other three 
Conventions drafted at the same time, the Convention on the High 
Seas boldly begins by saying, "The States parties to this Convention, 
desiring to codify. the rules of international lww relating to the high 
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seas . . . have agreed as follo-ws . ... '' 114 Thereafter, in Ar ticle 2, the 
Convent ion enumerates some of the freedoms of the high seas, the sec-
ond of which is "freedom of fishing." Thus, this Convention reaffirms 
the universal recognition of the basic principle of freedom of the seas 
for fishing as 'vell as for other purposes. 
Not only ·would the t'vo new principles recognize preferential and 
exclusive fish ing rights in limited areas of the high seas for the first 
t ime, but, perhaps more importantly, such rights 'vould be r ecognized 
apart lro1n the qu·es'tion o I the delimitation o I the territorial sea. 
It 'vill be re1nembered from the previous discussion that t he F irst 
Committee of the Conference proposed the incorporation into the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of an article 
providing for an exclusive fishing zone. This recent action by an in-
ternational conference on the law of the sea in attempting to keep the 
coastal fisheries problem inextricably linked 'vith the question o:f de-
limiting the territorial sea followed the customary but, thus far, un-
successful joint (and muddled) approach to the solution of t'vo 
diverse problems. It is now proposed that these two proble1ns be 
separated .and that the coastal fisheries problem be resolved under the 
three complementary principles which would balance the equities be- -
t'veen coastal and overseas fishing states. 
Many years ago Professor Riesenfeld, a distinguished scholar, r ec-
ognized that "rightly or wrongly, the question of coastal fisheries is 
closely bound up with the international la'v of terr itorial 
'vaters .... " 115 Our analysis leads to the firm conviction that the 
t'vo questions have been wrongly bound for too long a time. 
It is hoped that the establishment of the three complementary prin-
ciples enunciated above, detailed articles for which could be ham-
Inered out in an international conference dealing with coastal fisheries 
alone, will make it possible to solve t'vo of the most impor tant prob-
lems of the law of the sea in our time: (a) the problem of the precise 
delimitat ion of the territorial sea 'vith its overriding maritime and se-
curity aspects, and (b) the problem of fishing rights of coastal states. 
F. THE NEED FOR A NARROW TERRITORIAL SEA : THE 
UNITED STATES AND FREE WORLD PERSPECTIVE 
We turn now to a more detailed examination of the reasons 'vhy it 
is imperative from the perspective of the United States and the rest of 
the Free World to have as narrow a territorial sea as possible and 
hence the maximum freedom of the high seas for utilization by all 
inclusive users. 
114 U.N. Doc A/CONF.13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958). 
115 Riesenfeld, op. cit., footnote 109 (at 3). 
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But first it 'vill be helpful to revie\v briefly the four principal rea-
sons why many states favor an extension of the territorial sea :fron1 
the present three miles to as much as 200 n1iles. 
l. Principal Reasons Why Many States Favor An Extension of 
The Territorial Sea 
(a) First and foremost is the desire on the part of several coastal 
fishing states to achieve an extension of their exclusive fishing rights 
through the blanket device o:f extending the territorial sea. It \vill be 
remembered that in some instances, particularly in the case of certain 
South American countries which claim that their only purpose is con-
servation of fisheries, it has been asserted that the territorial sea is 
not being extended. Yet this puzzling disa vo\val hardly coincides 
either with the language of the decrees which have claimed sovereignty 
over a wide belt o:f high seas,116 or with the actual practice o:f excluding 
overseas fishing vessels or fining them for fishing within 200 miles o:f 
the coast, and even beyond that distance.117 
The device of a blanket extension of the territorial sea as a means 
of achieving an increase in the area of exclusive fishing rights is under-
standable from the limited perspective o:f the coastal fishing interests 
and as a manifestation of an unfortunate and narrow national egoism. 
However, as shown above, it is possible :for the needs of all fishing 
states, coastal as well as overseas, to be fulfilled on an equitable basis 
by the separation o:f the coastal fisheries problem from the question 
].1
6 See discussion of tripartite claims of Chile-Ecuador-Peru, supra Ch. I, 
pp. 51-58. 
117 The most flagrant case involved the November 1954 seizure by Peru of five 
\vhaling vessels owned by Onassis, under a Panamanian flag. Two of the vessels 
were captured 160 n1iles off the Peruvian coast, two ·were attacked 300 n1iles off 
the coast, and the fifth, a factory ship, was 364 miles off the coast, according to 
information furnished by Panama to the Organization of American States. Peru 
refused to release the vessels until fines of $3 million were paid, 90% by Lloyd's 
of London and 10% by United States insurance companies. Phleger, "Some 
Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas," 32 State Dept Bull. 
934, 937 (1955) ; l\1acChesney, op. cit., footnote 23 (at 289). A somewhat less 
flagrant violation of the freedom of the high seas, although still serious, was a 
later incident (March 1955) involving the seizure by Ecuador of two American 
flag fishing vessels 14 to 25 miles off the Ecuadorian coast. An America n seaman 
was seriously wounded by gunfire and fines of nearly $50,000 were imposed on 
the two vessels. (Ibid.) 
Prior to the two incidents, the United States had passed legislation protecting 
vessels on the high seas and in territorial waters of foreign countries the purpose 
of which was to provide a means of reimbursing the owner out of the United 
States Treasury for any fine which he had to pay to secure release of the vessel 
and crew. (Public Law 680, 27 August 1954, Chapte·r 25) ; MacChesney, op. cit., 
footnote 23 (at 436). 
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of the breadth of the territorial sea and the concurrent establish1nent 
of three broad complementary princi pies : ( 1) freedom of fishing on 
the high seas, ( 2) preferential fishing r ights of the coastal state in 
limited areas adjacent to the coast, and ( 3) exclusive fishing rights o:f 
the coastal state in li1nited areas adjacent to the coast in a few excep-
tional cases.118 
(b) Second is the desire on the part o£ so1ne states, particularly 
many newly independent states, to reject the three-mile limit because 
o£ the association of that limit vvith the large vvestern maritime 
powers vv ho, in some cases, ·were the former colonial In asters o:f the 
nevv states. Several of these states constituted an Afro-Asian group 
at the Conference. An equally strong psychological reason for re-
jecting the three-mile limit in favor of a wider breadth, which also 
lacks justification from a rational, long-run perspective, is what might 
be described as "keeping up 'vith one's neighbors." Early evidence 
of this reason for favoring an extension of the territorial sea was 
indicated in the forthright statement of Mr. Spiropoulos, the dis-
tinguished delegate from Greece, in the debate in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly prior to the opening of the Geneva. 
Conference, 
"The breadth of Greece's territorial sea at present is six n1iles 
I an1 going to tell you a secret, which I hope you will forget 
when you leave this room. We did not want a six-mile limit; 
we felt no need for it; but vve were surrounded by States 
which, even at the time of The Hague Conference, were 
insisting on a six-mile limit. Obviously, Greece could not re-
tain the three-mile rule when neighbouring States were claim-
ing six miles. I repeat, my Government is ready to accept 
any solution which will promote the freedom of the high 
seas. We are prepared to waive our present six-mile limit 
and accept a lower limit. Nevertheless, if neighbouring 
States extend their territorial sea to a breadth of twelve 
1niles, Greece will have no choice but to follow suit.'' 119 
(c) Third is the desire of the Soviet bloc to extend the territorial 
sea to twelve miles obstensibly :for "security" reasons but actually to 
advance their belligerent interests 120 and to increase the effectiveness 
of their submarines, particularly during 'vartime. In this regard, 
~fr. Dean, head of the United States delegation to the Geneva Con-
ference, has written, in line with arguments he presented at the Con-
ference, of the unjustifiable advantages a belligerent could gain from 
a widespread extension of the territorial sea. 
118 See discussion supra, pp. 109-115. 
119 I Verbatim Record (A/CONF. 13/19, 58 (1957)). 
120 Heinzen, "The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas," 
11 Stanford Law Review 597, 653 (1959). 
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"An extension of the territorial sea of neutr al nations would 
dramatically increase the striking po,ver of enen1y sub-
marines. Submarines normally oper ate 'vith considerable . 
difficulty and 'vith 1nuch risk under 'vater " .. ithin three miles 
f rom shore but their freedom of movement is greatly in-
creased bet,veen three and t'velve miles. If the territorial 
sea 'vere extended to twelve miles, an enemy sub1narine, 
particularly one 'vith atomic pow·er which might <;>perate for 
long periods 'vithout surfacing, could operate possibly un-
detected under w·aters in a neutral state's territorial sea. But 
our surface ships could not operate on the surface of these 
'vaters 'vithin the territorial sea 'vithout risking charges of 
violating such state's neutrality. An extension of the ter-
r itorial sea to twelve miles might thus n1ake an enemy fleet 
of subn1arines, capable of discharging missiles from near the 
coast, practically inviolable while operating under ·water in 
the territorial seas. '; 121 
That this rather obvious, though unstated, reason for the Soviet 
bloc's rejection of the Free "\Vorld sponsored three-mile limit (and 
to a lesser extent the Afro-Asian group's similar rejection and ad-
voeacy of a twelve-mile limit), 'vas for the purpose of seriously crip-
pling the navies of the United States and her allies is borne out by 
the penet rat ing observation of Professor Sorensen, Chairman of the 
D anish delegation, 
"The emphasis (by the United States) on military con-
siderations naturally had the effect of strengthening opposi-
t ion to the three-mile rule by those states, belonging to the 
Soviet as 'vell as to the Afro-Asian group, 'vhich are antago-
nistic to the naval supremacy of the Western po,vers." 122 
(d) Fourth is the desire of certain Arab states to support a 
twelve-mile limit primarily for the purpose of preventing Israel fron1 
having an outlet to the "high seas" of the Gulf of Aqaba.123 
A complete list of the reasons 'vhy it is imperative to have as nar-
row a territorial sea as possible, at least from the perspective of the 
United States and her allies would include an enumer~ation of all 
major objectives of the Free World such as po,ver, wealth, enlighten-
ment, well-being and so forth, achieved through democratic proc-
121 Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What 'Vas 
Accomplished," op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607, 610). 
122 Sorensen, op. cit., footnote 17 (at 245). 
123 See discussion supra, p. 99. 
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esses.124 For our purposes, ho,vever , it 1n ay be \vell to focus 
attention on \vhat might be categorized as 1nilitary and economic 
reasons for a narrow territorial sea.1 25 
124 McDougal and Burke, op. ci t. , f ootnote 25 (at 549- 550) . The general 
objectives enumerated by :McDougal a nd B urke are worth listing here: 
''OBJECTIVES 
The objectives sought by claimant states embrace all the cha racteristic de 
1nands of the nation-state for the protection and enhancen1ent of its bases of 
power as such demands are projected upon the oceans a nd include also the 
various pa rticular demands which sta tes habitua lly put forward on beha lf of 
the other, nongovernmental participants. In brief summary, some of the more 
significant of these manifold changing objectives n1ay be· related to certain 
general value categories. 
"P ower is sought by states in advancing claims t o con t r ol access to their 
own territorial base, to secure effective and economical a ccess t o the territorial 
bases of others and to share in the establishment and a dministration of a 
stable public order of the oceans. In time of war, of course, belligerent s ta tes 
seek to obtain command of the sea or to deny it to the enemy in order t o 
interdict enemy commerce and to make his use of the sea for communication 
as costly as possible. 
"Wealth may be seen as a goal in the great congeries of claims relating to 
transportation, navigation, fishing and mineral exploitation. One may observe 
demands both to limit access to territorial base resources and markets and to 
foster ease of access to distant resources and markets .. 
"Enlightenment is pursued as a 1najor goal in atte1npts to preserve the sea a s 
a locale for conducting scientific research and exploration and as a cheap and 
efficient means of transportation and conununication, affording access no t only 
to the homeland but to the whole globe for the acquisition of new knowledge. 
"Well-being is a fundan1ental objective in the variety of claims directed t oward 
prevention of plagues and preservation of health, and in certain claims to fishery 
exploitation. 
"Respect is sought in the efforts of a claimant to secure access as an equal 
participant, free from discrimination, in all the power-enhancing and wealth-
producing activities of the world which have special reference to the use of the 
oceans. The enormous importance attached to fleets, control of ports and the 
display of flags, as symbols of status, is commonplace. 
"Skill has been a traditional objective of states in seeking to assure through 
use of the oceans and access to the experience of others a reservoir of trained 
maritime and other personnel for purposes of both war and peace. 
"Solidarity-primary and large group attachments--is embodied in demands 
which emphasize the oceans as means of promoting broader identification of 
peoples by providing a focus for organization of transnational loyalties and 
common sentiment, as in the North Atlantic community. 
"Rectitude appears as a goal in attempts to reconcile many varying concep-
tions of right and wrong from many different cultures, both in a law of the sea 
and in other standards, for the promotion of co-operative activity." 
125 Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea .,: What 'Vas Accmn-
plished," op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607-608). 
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2. Military Reasons for a Narrow Territorial Sea 
The United States and most of the other countries of the Free 
vVorld comprise an oceanic confederation. Since a majority of the 
states of the F ree vVorld bloc, as well as some important neutral states, 
are maritime states, their security is dependent upon the mobility and 
flexibility of their o·vvn and United States naval forces and merchant 
fleets. It 1nust be emphasized that the Free World bloc is inter-
dependent; no one of the states-not even the United States as power-
ful as she is-can stand alone against either the hot or cold war 
designs, probings, and pressures of Con1munist states, particularly the 
Soviet Union. 
Inasmuch as the Free World states, including not only coastal states 
but land-locked states as well, are so interdependent both for security 
and economic development, the lifelines which bind them together 
are the sea lanes through which effective military forces may be 
deployed and war materiel and econon1ic goods transported whenever 
a Communist coup appears imminent. 
At the present time the Free World countries as a group have a 
decided advantage both as na,val 126 and commercial maritime 
powers.127 
Since the United States Navy and merchant fleets and the navies 
and n1erchant fleets of the rest of the Free World are major instru-
126 Jane's Fight ing Ships, 70 (1959-60) ; Brassey's Annual, "The Armed Forces 
Year-Book," passim (1958). 
127 JJferchant Fleets of the World (as of Dec. 31, 1958), U.S. Maritiine Admin-
istration. The rankings of the first twelve states at the end of 1958 were as 
follows ( Ibid., 2 ) : 
DEADWEIGHT 
RANK STATE TONS 
1 United States--------------------------------------------- 33,653,000 
2 United Kingdom __________________________________________ 24, 372, 000 
3 Liberia -------------------------------------------------- 17, 790, 000 
4 Nor,vay -------------------------------------------------- 14,142,000 
5 Japan--------------------------------------------------- 7,723,000 
6 Panama-------------------------------------------------- 6,609,000 
7 Italy ---------------------------------------------------- 6,503,000 
8 West GermanY-------------------------------------------- 5,660,000 
9 The Netherlands----------------------------------~------- 5,46~000 
10 France -------------------------------------------------- 5,398,000 
11 Sweden-------------------------------------------------- 4,751,000 
12 U.S.S.R. ------------------------------------------------- 3,809,000 
(Note: The above publication appears to be in error at 15 in saying that 
Denmark "ranked twelfth among the maritime nations of the world." At the 
end of 1958 Denmark had only 2,745,000 deadweight tons of merchant fleet 
which is less than that for the U.S.S.R. even if one deducts from the figure 
given above (3,809,000) the 785,000 deadweight tons of lend-lease vessels.) 
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n1ents in preserving world peace, and since the effectiveness of these 
navies and merchant fleets depends so much upon the maximum free-
doin of the high seas for unrestricted and unfettered navigation, it is 
imperative that the territorial seas of the world be kept to a minimum. 
It has already been noted that an extension of the territorial sea from 
three to six miles would mean that more than fifty international straits 
which are now· high seas would become territorial seas, and an ex-
tension from three to twelve miles would mean that more than one 
hundred international straits which are no'v high seas would become 
territorial seas.128 
While it is true that under the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone warships as well as merchant ships have the right 
of innocent passage, and while this right rna y not be suspended in 
international straits even temporarily by the coastal state either under 
provisions of the Convention/29 or under the decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case,I30 "passage" as de~ 
fined in the Convention is limited to the specific purpose of traversing 
the sea.131 
Moreover, the coastal state may impose regulations on navigation 
through its territorial sea and even suspend passage temporarily in 
such waters (other than in straits) if such suspension "is essential 
:for the protection of its security." 132 Therefore, the navies and mer-
chant fleets of the Free World would have far less mobility and far 
:fewer rights in the extended area of the territorial seas beyond three 
miles than they now have when those waters are high seas. 
It must be emphasized again and again that the right of freedom 
of navigation on the high seas is a greater right than the right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state. The 
former right (i.e., freedom of navigation on the high seas) is the 
right to use a common resource subject only to (a) the general obliga-
tion to accommodate other inclusive users, and (b) any self-imposed 
specific obligation resulting from a treaty. The latter right (i.e., 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea) is a limited 
right to use an exclusive rather than a common resource over which 
the coastal state has sovereignty. In its exercise of sovereignty the 
128 See discussion, supra, p. 90. For a brief geographical and hydrographical 
study of some of the major straits which constitute routes for international 
traffic, see U.N. Preparatory Document No.6 (A/CONF. 13/6 and Add. 1 (1957)), 
mimeographed, and also printed in I Official Records (A/CONF. 13/37, 114-164 
(1958)). 
129 Art. 16 ( 4). 
13° Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports 4 (1949) ; 43 A.J.I.L. 558 (1949). 
131 Art.l4(2). 
132 Art. 16 ( 3). 
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coastal state may issue rules and regulations governing the "passage" 
through its territorial sea and may, under proper conditions, even 
suspend such passage (i.e., the right of innocent passage is subject 
to divestment). It follows that the right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea, while by no means a second-class right, is not the 
equivalent of the right to navigate freely on the high seas. There-
fore, it is imperative that the area of the high seas be kept to the 
maximum and the breadth of the territorial sea be kept as narrow 
as possible. 
Moreover, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the military 
air forces and the commercial air fleets of the Free World, which are 
also a vital deterrent to the spread of Communism, would be even 
more hampered by an extension of the territorial sea beyond the 
three-mile limit than would be true of the navies and merchant fleets 
of the Free World for the reason that the right of innocent passage 
does not apply to the airspace above the territorial sea.. As ~{r. Dean 
has said, 
"There is no right for aircraft to overfly another nation's 
territorial sea except under a treaty, with its consent, or pur-
suant to the Chicago Civil Aviation Convention of 1944 as 
to the contracting parties thereto." 133 
It is unfortunate that international law at present does not accord 
to aircraft the same right of innocent passage to overfly the territorial 
sea as warships and merchant vessels have to navigate thereon, except, 
of course, \vhere control or exclusion of foreign aircraft is necessary ( 
for security reasons. The United 1\::ingdom in its compromise pro-
posal to extend the territorial sea to six miles inserted a provision 
\Vhich would have kept the airspace above the outward three miles 
free :for aircraft to overfly as though it were airspace above high 
seas.134 While this provision was laudable as an effort to keep the 
airspace as free as possible for unrestricted flight, it failed to achieve 
much support. 
It should be emphasized that the increased mobility and flexibility 
which a narrow territorial sea gives to the navies and the air :forces of 
the Free World does not mean that the striking force o:f these defense 
components will have to be used to deter the spread o£ communism. 
Indeed, the deterrent effect often results from the mere presence and , 
display of the navies and air forces. vVitness, for example, the de-
133 Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Ac-
complished," op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607, 610). 
134 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 134 (1958) ; 3 Official Records 247-8 (1958). 
The United Kingdom proposal protected not only the existing rights of air 
passage in the outer three miles, but all vessels, including warships. 
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terrent effect of the presence of the United States Seventh Fleet in the 
defense of the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and 
the stabilizing influence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean. 
While it is true that the deterrent effect of a display of :force in a 
given area of the world is difficult to measure, largely because it is 
psychological, the Free World should strive unceasingly to retain 
whatever advantage is derived :from such display. To do this, it 
would be highly desirable to retain the present three-mile limit; it 
is imperative that the Free World not agree to an extension of the 
territorial sea beyond six miles. One reason is clear: ships and air-
craft may be identified visually, though not well, at six miles. How-
ever, at twelve miles it is not possible to see an aircraft with the 
naked eye, nor to identify even large warships. Hence, the deterrent 
effect and stabilizing influence o:f a display of naval :force in a 
trouble-area of the world where a three-mile territorial sea exists 
would be reduced by at least 50% if the limit were extended to six 
miles; it would be reduced to nil with a 12-mile territorial sea. 
Finally, one may include among the military reasons why the 
territorial sea should be kept as narrow as possible-preferably a 
three-mile limit but in all events not more than six miles-the fact 
that as the territorial sea becomes wider the problems of neutral states 
become greater. Far too often states tend to think o:f their rights 
in the territorial sea (i.e., sovereignty, exclusive fishing, etc.) and 
:forget their corollary duties. These duties involve both economic 
considerations, such as the cost of installing and maintaining naviga-
tional aids, (see below) and military considerations. 
From the military standpoint, if a neutral state is to maintain its 
neutrality in order to avoid the cost in lives and property of becoming 
embroiled in belligerency, it is necessary for it to patrol its territorial 
sea. The wider the territorial sea, the larger the patrol fleet which 
would be required. Conversely, the narrower the territorial sea the 
smaller the patrol fleet and the less chance of inadvertent involvement 
jn the belligerency. 
If the small maritime states o:f the world, particularly those with 
strategic coastlines and strong desires to remain neutra1 in a possible 
conflict between other states, would weigh carefully the added bur-
dens and risks which any extension of the territorial sea would im-
pose upon their neutrality, it is firmly believed that they would line 
up solidly in :favor of a retention of the three-mile limit. The ex-
ercise of sovereignty over the territorial sea is a responsibility and 
a risk as .well as a right. Minimization of the risk is not achieved, 
nor withdrawal from risk enhanced, when the area of the' risk is 
enlarged. 
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3. Economic Reasons for a Narrow Territorial Sea 
In addition to the increased cost of patrolling an extended territorial 
sea by a netural state to insure conformance with the requirements 
of neutrality, the additional costs of installing and maintaining navi-
gational aids if the territorial sea were extended from three to six 
or twelve miles would prove to be a serious financial burden for 
many states, particularly those which are relatively poor economically. 
It is estimated that the United States would _require an expendi-
ture of several million dollars plus a substantial increase in annual 
operating costs of more than a n1.illion dollars for each 100 miles of 
coastline if the territorial sea were extended from three to twelve 
miles. In addition, burdensome expenditures would have to be made 
for navigational aids and to change the charts, maps, and manuals 
which mariners must use. Of course, the initial expenditures and 
added financial expense required per mile of coastline would vary 
throughout the world2 depending upon the geomorphological condi-
tions. But, it is clear that for all maritime states, especially for 
the small, economically underdeveloped ones, the additional cost of 
an extended territorial sea would prove financially burdensome. 
In addition to the increased economic burdens on the coastal state 
as indicated above, an extension of the territorial sea would increase 
the cost of transporting goods and people. Landlocked states as well 
as coastal states would suffer from these increased costs. 
Despite the recognized right of innocent passage of vessels through 
the territorial sea, the movement of goods and people both by surface 
vessels and aircraft would be adversely affected by an extension of the f 
territorial sea. New, longer, and in many cases more hazardous routes 
would have to be developed in order to a void the hampering regula-
tions which some coastal states would undoubtedly i1npose upon ves-
sels using their extended territorial seas. 
As the chairman of the United States delegation to the United 
Nations Conference has said, 
"The operation of commercial shipping on, or commercial 
aircraft over, water would also be greatly handicapped, 
slowed down and subjected to interminable delays. Indeed, 
it would seem to have been part of the Russian purpose in 
backing extensions of the territorial sea so to hamper the 
commerce of the free world as a part of its saud-in-the-gear-
box technique. . . The right and ability of merchant ships 
carrying goods and passengers to schedule the most economi-
cal passage possible between ports, to enter and leave harbors 
freely, and to move on the surface of the water without in-
interruption or delay would be jeojardized." 135 
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Inasmuch as the cost of all movement of goods and people by ships 
and aircraft must be borne eventually by the recipients of the goods 
and services, the impediments to such commerce and transportation 
and the added risks thereof resulting from an extension of the terri-
torial sea 'vould be reflected in higher costs. These increased costs 
'vould represent an unnecessary economic waste and result in a fur -
ther shackling of international trade at a time 'vhen one of the great 
needs of the world is to facilitate the free flow of goods and people. 
It is seldom realized that the 'vorld's ocean commerce accounts for 
more than three quarters of the total tonnage of goods exchanged 
among states.136 To advocate an increase in the already heavy bur -
dens on that commerce by extending the territorial sea from the 
present three-mile limit to, say, t'velve miles, is to take temporary 
leave from one's common sense. 
It may be concluded that both for military and economic reasons it 
is imperative from the perspective of the United States and the rest of 
the Free World that the territorial sea be kept as narrow as possible, 
preferably at the present three-n1ile limit, or at most extended to not 
over a six-mile limit.137 
135 Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: Wha t Was Accom-
plished," op. cit., footnote 8 (at 607, 612). 
136 Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Commerce and Governments 429 (1955). 
137 'Vere it not for the fact that the concept of a territorial sea is so firmly 
established in international law (albeit with widely disputed origin), and given 
an equitable solution to the coastal fisheries proble1n along the lines indicated 
above, it might be argued that the "territorial sea" be abolished entirely from 
international law. 
Many readers may gasp at this suggestion, and perhaps even recoil from the 
thought of pulling a state's boundaries back to the shoreline and abandoning a 
concept so venerable as the "territorial sea." Yet, a little sober reflection will 
lead to the unassailable conclusion that one of the primary reasons for the 
development of the concept, particularly during the 19th century, no longer has 
any real validity. Security of a coastal state against attack from the sea has 
been one of the foremost reasons why a state needed to extend its boundaries 
from the shoreline to encompass a narrow band of waters. Shore batteries could 
keep an invading force away from the coasts, and foreign nav;al vessels beyond 
the three-mile limit could not bombard the ports and military installations with 
their limited-range naval guns. Today, in an era of intercontinental ballist ic 
missiles and other advanced (and rapidly advancing) weaponry, which makes 
it possible for submarines to fire missiles while submerged several hundred 
miles at sea, the need for a territorial sea of three, six or even twelve miles as 
security against attack is meaningless. 
'Vhile it is still true that a coastal state needs some way to control access 
to its shores and the ocean and air traffic in the area immediately adjacent 
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ADDENDUM 
The above chapter was written prior to the convening of the second 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, March 
1960. For a discussion of the results of this Convention see Appendix 
N. 
thereto for a variety of purposes, including security against attack and the pre-
vention of infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary and other 
regulations, it is not necessary to have a territorial sea for this purpose. In 
fact, the inadequacy of the territorial sea for accomplishing such purposes is 
what led to the development of continguous zones, some of which extend out 
several hundred miles (e.g., the Air Defense Identification Zone for aircraft-
ADIZ). 
